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A number of recent studies provide conﬂicting pictures of the competitiveness of
Internet markets.1 For example, Brynjolfsson and Smith [2000] ﬁnd that E-commerce
markets for books and CDs are far from frictionless, with price ranges of around 30
percent. In contrast, Ellison and Ellison [2001] report dispersion of about 5 percent
for computer memory.
What accounts for the diﬀerences in the levels of price dispersion observed in
diﬀerent online markets?
One potential explanation is that price dispersion is a disequilibrium phenomenon
that is being corrected over time. The Ellison and Ellison data was collected several
years after that of Brynjolfsson and Smith, and the lower price dispersion might
reﬂect the fact that prices have moved toward perfectly competitive equilibrium as
consumers became more skillful in comparison shopping in online markets. This
explanation is consistent with the view that the Internet will ultimately lead to a
perfectly competitive equilibrium:
“The explosive growth of the Internet promises a new age of perfectly
competitive markets. With perfect information about prices and products
at their ﬁngertips, consumers can quickly and easily ﬁnd the best deals.
In this brave new world, retailers’ proﬁt margins will be competed away,
as they are all forced to price at cost.” The Economist,N o v e m b e r2 0 ,
1999, p. 112.
An alternative explanation is that price dispersion is an equilibrium phenomenon
and that the diﬀerences in price dispersion in the two studies stem from diﬀerences
in market structure. Competing sellers in the markets studied by Ellison and Ellison
number in the hundreds whereas fewer than twenty sellers compete in the markets
studied by Brynjolfsson and Smith, and the lower dispersion might stem from these
diﬀerences in the number of sellers.To examine these competing explanations, we assembled a dataset containing 4
million price observations in an online market for consumer electronics products.
These data are daily price quotes from merchants selling the top 1000 products cov-
ered by Shopper.com–a leading price comparison site on the Internet. The data
span the time horizon from August 2, 2000 through March 31, 2001. The number of
ﬁrms listing prices for these products varies a great deal–both cross sectionally and
over time–thus permitting us to examine the impact of variations in the number of
listing ﬁrms (and hence market structure) on price dispersion. Data from price com-
parison sites, such as the one analyzed in this paper, oﬀer a unique opportunity to (1)
quantify the role that the number of ﬁrms play in explaining diﬀerences in levels of
dispersion for diﬀerent products, and (2) diﬀerentiate among alternative theoretical
models of price dispersion. To the best of our knowledge there have been no empirical
studies of price dispersion on the Internet that examine how price dispersion varies
with market structure.
We ﬁnd little evidence to support the view that price dispersion is a disequi-
librium phenomenon that is being corrected over time. Instead, we ﬁnd persistent
price dispersion that depends on market structure. Speciﬁcally, despite the fact that
consumer usage of price comparison sites increased by 12.9 percent during the eight
m o n t hp e r i o dw es t u d y , 2 we ﬁnd no statistical evidence of any decline in levels of price
dispersion. Further, we ﬁnd systematic diﬀerences in price dispersion depending on
the number of ﬁrms listing prices for a given product: The level of price dispersion
is greater when small numbers of ﬁr m sl i s tp r i c e st h a nw h e nl a r g en u m b e r sd o .F o r
example, for products where only two ﬁrms list prices, the gap between their prices
(which is also the range of prices) averages 22 percent. In contrast, for products
where 17 ﬁrms list prices (the average in our sample), the gap between the two lowestprices falls to about 3.5 percent.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section II discusses several equi-
librium explanations of price dispersion, and oﬀers a general clearinghouse model
that matches many of the institutional characteristics of price comparison sites such
as Shopper.com. Our model subsumes a number of existing models, including Baye
and Morgan [2001], Narasimhan [1988], Rosenthal [1980], Shilony [1977], and Varian
[1980], as special cases. We show that the general model predicts that price dispersion
is an equilibrium phenomenon and that, for the leading special cases, price dispersion
is predicted to be greater in the small than in the large. Section III summarizes our
data and collection methodology and highlights diﬀerences between the Shopper.com
site and competing services (such as shopbots) available on the web, as well as the
strengths and limitations of our dataset. Empirical results are presented in Section
IV, while Section V attempts to discriminate among special cases of the general model
based on the ﬁndings in Section IV. Finally, an Appendix contains formal proofs of
various assertions made in the text.
II Theoretical Considerations
A number of papers in the economics literature predict that price dispersion will
persist in the Internet age. For example, Reinganum [1979], Burdett and Judd [1982],
Gatti [2001], and many others show that equilibrium price dispersion can arise if
t h e r ei sapositive marginal cost of obtaining each price quote. This provides an
appealing rationale for price dispersion documented in (1) conventional retail markets
where consumers must incur the incremental costs of searching for prices at ﬁrms’
brick-and-mortar stores,3 and (2) those electronic markets where consumers incur theincremental costs of searching for prices at diﬀerent ﬁrms’ online stores.4
While these models are relevant when it is costly to obtain each and every price
quote, price comparison sites such as Shopper.com, mySimon.com, and EvenBet-
ter.com now make it possible for consumers to obtain a list of prices for a given
product for what is close to a zero marginal cost of obtaining each price quote. A
product search at any one of these sites will return a listing of prices that diﬀerent
m e r c h a n t sc h a r g ef o rt h es a m ep r o d u c t . 5 For example, consider a consumer who
wants to purchase a Mag Innovision LT530C ﬂat panel monitor using Shopper.com.
One mouse click on March 26, 2001 brought up the list of prices displayed in Figure
1. Notice that these prices are dispersed, ranging from a low of $549 to a high of
$1138.34.
“Place Figure 1 approximately here.”
Clearinghouse models, which we discuss in detail below, more closely match the
environment consumers encounter at price comparison sites. These models assume
that information about prices is available through a clearinghouse, such as Shop-
per.com, and that some or all consumers access the list of prices to identify the
“best” price. As we will show, these models predict equilibrium price dispersion that
varies with market structure.
II(i) Measuring Price Dispersion
Before describing clearinghouse models in more detail, it is useful to brieﬂyd i s c u s s
some theoretical issues that arise when tracking price dispersion at sites such as
Shopper.com. Traditionally, economists have used the coeﬃcient of variation (cf.
Sorensen [2000] and Carlson-Pescatrice [1980]) or the range (cf. Brynjolfsson andSmith [2000]) to measure price dispersion in homogeneous product markets. When
t h el a wo fo n ep r i c eh o l d s ,a l lﬁrms in the market charge the same price and these
measures of price dispersion are all zero. Thus, it would seem natural to examine
the coeﬃcient of variation or range in prices over time to examine whether price
dispersion is a disequilibrium phenomenon that is being corrected over time. There
is, however, a theoretical diﬃculty with this approach: The coeﬃcient of variation
and range can indicate signiﬁcant price dispersion even when the underlying data are
consistent with a competitive equilibrium.
Consider the list of prices displayed in Figure 1. One can hardly imagine a more
dramatic departure from the law of one price. Based on the range, price dispersion
is over 107 percent of the lowest price; based on the coeﬃcient of variation it is 22.4
percent. Yet one can argue that these data are also consistent with a situation where
products are identical and all consumers purchase at one of the two ﬁrms charging the
lowest price, which happens to be marginal cost. That is, these data are consistent
with a competitive equilibrium in which no ﬁrm can gain by adjusting its price. To see
this, suppose the 11 ﬁrms listing prices in Figure 1 are price-setting oligopolists and
each has a marginal cost of $549. Given this list of prices, price-sensitive consumers
will naturally buy from one of the two ﬁrms oﬀering the lowest price of $549. While
ﬁrms charging prices above $549 do not haves a l e s ,t h e yh a v en oi n c e n t i v et og a i n
consumers by pricing at or below their costs of $549. Likewise, since two ﬁrms are
charging the lowest price in the market, neither can gain by unilaterally raising or
lowering its price. Thus, the apparent price dispersion is arguably a ﬁction: The list
of prices comprises an equilibrium in which all transactions take place at the perfectly
competitive price ($549).
We focus on a measure of price dispersion that alleviates this problem. Supposethe prices charged by n ≥ 2 ﬁrms for a given product are ordered from lowest to
highest, so that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... ≤ pn.W e d e ﬁne “the gap”, G = p2 − p1,t ob et h e
diﬀerence between the two lowest prices. Clearly, the classical Bertrand model implies
that the gap between the two lowest prices is zero in any equilibrium (symmetric or
otherwise). Thus, in any competitive equilibrium, price dispersion measured by G is
zero (and therefore independent of the number of ﬁrms). The gap measure also has
the empirically desirable property that it gives greater weight to low prices, which
are presumably more likely to lead to sales than high prices. Thus, it is a proxy for a
quantity-weighted measure of price dispersion if, as seems likely, consumers visiting
the site tend to be price-sensitive.
II(ii) Clearinghouse Models
While G =0in a competitive equilibrium, we show in this section that positive gaps
between the two lowest prices always arise as equilibrium behavior in clearinghouse
models. The distinguishing feature of clearinghouse models is that identical ﬁrms
sell to two types of consumers: Those who buy at the lowest price listed at the
clearinghouse, and those who do not. Consumers who do not buy at the lowest listed
price may be loyal to a particular ﬁrm (as in Narasimhan, Rosenthal, or Shilony)
or may be unwilling or unable to access the site (as in Baye-Morgan and Varian).6
These models all predict that the list of prices obtained at the site will exhibit price
dispersion despite quite diﬀerent assumptions regarding the number of ﬁrms, product
homogeneity, ﬁrms’ decisions to list prices at the clearinghouse, consumers’ decisions
to utilize the clearinghouse, and the fees charged by the clearinghouse to consumers
and ﬁrms using its services to acquire or transmit price information. Furthermore,
these models predict that the level of price dispersion depends on the number of ﬁrmsthat list prices. In particular, all of these models predict that the expected diﬀerence
between the lowest two prices is greater in the small than in the large.7
To establish this, we develop a general clearinghouse model which includes each
of these models as a special case.
Suppose that there are n>1 ﬁrms with constant marginal cost m ≥ 0 competing
in a market by oﬀering some identical product to consumers. This market is served
by a price clearinghouse. Firms must decide what price to charge for the product
and whether to list this price at the clearinghouse. Let pi denote the price charged
by ﬁrm i. It costs a ﬁrm an amount φ ≥ 0 if it chooses to list its price. All consumers
have unit demand and a maximal willingness to pay of r>m . 8 Of these, L ≥ 0
consumers per ﬁrm are price-insensitive “loyal” consumers and will purchase from
the ﬁrm to which they are loyal if its price does not exceed r. Otherwise, they do
not buy the product at all.9 An u m b e r ,S>0, of the consumers are price sensitive
“shoppers.” These consumers ﬁrst consult the clearinghouse and buy at the lowest
price listed there provided this price does not exceed r. If no prices are advertised
at the clearinghouse or all listed prices exceed r, then a “shopper” visits one of the
ﬁrms at random and purchases if its price does not exceed r.
Several well-known clearinghouse models emerge as special cases of the general
model. For instance, letting M ≥ 0 denote a constant, the general model reduces to:
• The Baye-Morgan [2001] model when φ>0 and L = M
n ;
• The Varian [1980] model when φ =0and L = M
n > 0;
• The Narasimhan [1988] model when φ =0 ,L= M
n > 0,a n dn =2 ;
• The Rosenthal [1980] and Shilony [1977] models when φ =0and L>0 is
constant.Proposition 1 establishes that if it is not too costly for ﬁrms to list prices at the
clearinghouse, price dispersion always arises in the general clearinghouse model.
Proposition 1 Suppose 0 ≤ φ< n
n−1 (r − m)S. Then in a symmetric equilibrium to
the general clearinghouse model:
1. The expected gap between the two lowest listed prices is strictly positive.


























Proof. The proof of part 1 follows from the fact that the distribution of listed
prices is atomless and has non-degenerate support. The proof of part 2 follows as
a consequence of a more general existence result (Theorem 1), which is stated and
proved in the Appendix.
Thus, under a wide variety of modeling approaches, the general clearinghouse
model predicts equilibrium price dispersion, the level of which depends on market
structure. Furthermore, under mild assumptions discussed in the Appendix, the
leading special cases of this model all share the following property relating price
dispersion to market structure.Proposition 2 In the Baye-Morgan, Varian, Rosenthal, and Shilony models, price
dispersion (as measured by the expected gap) is greater in the small (when 2 ﬁrms list
prices) than in the large (when an arbitrarily large number of ﬁrms list prices).
Proof. The proof is contained in the Appendix.
III Data
We base our empirical analysis on 4 million daily price listings by diﬀerent merchants
selling the most popular 1,000 products at Shopper.com for the eight month period
August 2, 2000 — March 31, 2001.10 As noted above, Shopper.com is an “information
clearinghouse” that specializes in price comparisons for identical consumer electronics
products sold by diﬀerent ﬁrms. It touts the most comprehensive price catalog for
these items on the Internet, with over 100,000 products. Moreover, there is consid-
erable ﬁrm participation on the site–at any given time, there are more than one
million price quotes listed there. Shopper.com generates over 175,000 qualiﬁed leads
per day to merchants listing prices on its site.11 Thus, there is also considerable con-
sumer traﬃc on the site. Shopper.com is owned and operated by Cnet.com, which is
consistently among the most viewed sites on the Internet. Each month over 9 million
unique consumers access Cnet.12 In addition to price information, users of Shop-
per.com have one-click access to Cnet’s extensive database of technical speciﬁcations
and reviews. The Cnet site is ranked ﬁrst among consumer electronics shopping sites
and tenth among all web sites on the Internet.13
We gathered information from the site once per day by running a program written
in the PERL programming language (known hereafter as “the spider”), which down-
loaded this data. For each of the top 1000 products listed at the site on a given date,the spider collected the product rank for each product and the prices listed by all
ﬁrms selling that product. The product rank variable consists of a number from 1 to
1000 indicating each product’s relative popularity measured by the number of quali-
ﬁed leads for that product in the recent past. The information posted at Shopper.com
(including prices) is updated twice each day.14 Consequently, the products included
in our sample as well as their rank changes over time. Items in our sample include
the Palm III and Palm V personal digital assistants, Canon G1 digital camera, Oﬃce
2000 software, and the HP Deskjet 930C inkjet printer.
“Place Table I approximately here.”
Table I provides various summary statistics for our data, including the number
of competing ﬁrms, price levels, and three diﬀerent measures of price dispersion (the
range, coeﬃcient of variation, and the percentage gap between the lowest two prices).
Notice that the percentage gap measure of price dispersion (deﬁned as diﬀerence in
the lowest two prices relative to the lowest price) is the unit-free analog of the Gap
measure deﬁned above. Since all of these measures of dispersion are zero for products
sold by a single ﬁrm, we distinguish between observations where only a single ﬁrm
lists a price for a product on a given day (denoted as “Single-Price Listings” in Table
I), and those where two or more ﬁrms list prices (denoted as “Multi-Price Listings”).
Various measures of price dispersion summarize the set of prices oﬀered for a given
product on a given date. Thus, the relevant unit of observation for these measures
is what we term a “product date.” With daily price observations for 1000 products
over an eight month period, there about a quarter-million product dates. As shown
in Table I, our analysis of price dispersion consists of 214,337 product dates with
multi-price listings and 13,743 with single-price listings.Compared to existing studies, the products in our dataset tend to be fairly ex-
pensive, with an average price of $513 across all products and dates.15 The average
minimum price is $458, or about 12 percent lower than the average price. Notice that
both the average price and average minimum price tend to be higher for less popular
products (those with higher ranks). Products with multiple price listings have a lower
average price and average minimum price than those with single price listings. Of
course, since the mix of products being oﬀered might diﬀer between single price and
multiple price listings, these diﬀerences in the levels of prices must be interpreted
with caution.
On average, about 17 ﬁrms list prices for each product in our sample. Products
ranking in the top 250 tend to attract more ﬁrms than products not ranked in the top
250. The average range in prices is between $123 and $131, depending upon whether
one includes or excludes single-price listings. Levels of price dispersion diﬀer a great
deal depending on the measure used. The average range in prices is about 40%, while
the average gap between the two lowest prices is only 5%. The coeﬃcient of variation
lies between these two measures of dispersion, averaging about 10%. Interestingly,
while the average coeﬃcient of variation is invariant to product rank, the average
percentage gap between the lowest two prices is smaller for more popular products.
One might therefore speculate that product popularity is a key determinant of price
dispersion. However, notice that the more popular products also tend to have more
price listings, on average. As we shall see below, diﬀerences in the number of ﬁrms–
not product ranks–are the key to explaining diﬀerences in price dispersion across
products.
“Place Table II approximately here.”
There is considerable variation in the number of ﬁrms listing prices for productsin our data. Table II shows that single-ﬁrm markets accounted for 13,743, or 6.03
percent, of product dates. Over 80 percent of all product dates have between 2 and
30 prices listed, with the number of listings roughly uniformly distributed over this
range. Observations where 31 to 40 ﬁrms list prices are more rare, accounting for less
than 10 percent of all product dates. Product dates where more than 40 ﬁrms list
prices account for less than 3 percent of our data.
Before turning to the analysis of the data, it is useful to highlight some of the
strengths and limitations of our study. Key strengths of the dataset used in our
study are its duration (eight months), its size (4 million price observations), and
its composition (1000 diﬀerent consumer electronics items). The average low price
for a product in our dataset is about $460. In contrast, previous studies of price
dispersion on the Internet have focused on price dispersion at an instant in time,
and have documented price ranges of up to 30 percent for products such as books
and CDs, which typically cost around $15. One might argue that price diﬀerences of
$4.50 on a $15 item reﬂect the willingness of some consumers to pay a premium to
use a merchant with whom they have an ongoing relationship. It seems less plausible
that the price ranges observed in our dataset ($135 on a $460 consumer electronics
item) are primarily due to such factors. Another possible explanation for the price
dispersion documented in previous studies is that there are economies of scale in
shipping these products: it may be optimal for consumers to pay above the lowest
price for a single item in order to purchase a low-priced bundle from a single merchant.
This explanation of price dispersion seems less plausible for the products in our
dataset: Shipping costs are small compared to the average price in our sample, and
electronics products (such as digital cameras or personal digital assistants) would
seem to be less likely to be purchased in bundles than books or CDs.An important consideration when analyzing data from price comparison services
is the veracity and “seriousness” of the oﬀers listed there. The Shopper.com site
has a number of advantages in this regard. First, in contrast to sites relying on
shopbot technology,16 the prices listed at Shopper.com are directly inputted by the
ﬁrms themselves. Moreover, it is not free for ﬁrms to list prices on Shopper.com.
Speciﬁcally, a merchant wishing to list its product pays a one-time, non-refundable
fee of $1,000. In addition, at the beginning of each month, it pays an additional fee
of $100. Merchants who receive over 250 qualiﬁe dl e a d si nag i v e nm o n t hm u s tp a y
$0.50 per lead for the ﬁrst 50,000 leads, and $0.60 for each additional lead. In light of
Shopper.com’s fee structure and the fact that the site generates over 175,000 qualiﬁed
leads per day, merchants would seem to have a sharp incentive to post serious prices.
A ﬁrm attempting a bait and switch strategy — listing a low price with no intention
of honoring it — is exposed to considerable downside risk in the form of generating
numerous qualiﬁed leads (costing at least 50 cents each) while generating few sales
and presumably alienating potential customers. On the other hand, ﬁrms listing
artiﬁcially high prices are unlikely to generate enough sales from the site to justify
the associated ﬁxed fees of listing.
Second, we conducted an audit of prices listed at Shopper.com for ten randomly
selected products among the top 1000. Since Cnet updates the prices listed on Shop-
per.com twice per day while ﬁrms are free to update prices at their own sites contin-
uously, one would expect some diﬀerences in prices to arise even if, at the time of the
listing, all prices listed were 100 percent accurate. In fact, we found that 96 percent
of the 171 prices audited were accurate to within $1. Moreover, 100 percent of the
low prices were accurate.17
Third, there is evidence that consumers can indeed purchase products listed onShopper.com at the prices listed on the site. We purchased over 30 items (ranging
in price from a $30 headset to a $600 ﬂat panel monitor) from a number of diﬀerent
merchants listing prices at Shopper.com. In all cases, the prices we paid and the
goods received corresponded to the information posted at the site.18 This is not
surprising, since Shopper.com uses a variety of reputational mechanisms that punish
vendors who might otherwise be tempted to post erroneous information. For these
reasons, we think there is strong evidence to suggest that the price quotes contained
in our dataset are serious.
In addition, ﬁrms listing prices on Shopper.com make sales almost exclusively on-
line and thus are highly dependent on maintaining their reputations in online chan-
nels. At the time of our study, of the three largest “big box” consumer electronics
retailers (BestBuy, Circuit City and CompUSA), only BestBuy had online presence
(and only near the end of the study). Thus, the typical merchant selling products at
Shopper.com had no brick and mortar presence whatsoever.
The primary limitation of our data is that we were unable to obtain data on the
actual quantities of goods purchased at the observed prices.19 Classical Bertrand
models predict that all consumers will purchase from the low-priced ﬁrm while clear-
inghouse models predict that a positive fraction of customers will purchase only at
the lowest price while other consumers who are brand loyal or uninformed will pur-
chase at higher prices. Lacking quantity data, we cannot assess whether the predicted
sensitivity of consumer behavior more closely matches the Bertrand or clearinghouse
predictions. In particular, the classical Bertrand model predicts that a consumer’s
demand for an individual ﬁrm’s product is perfectly elastic, while clearinghouse mod-
els predict that the demand for an individual ﬁrm’s product is highly elastic, but not
perfectly elastic.20 Some evidence on this issue is contained in Ellison and Ellison[2001], who examine price and quantity data on computer memory chips sold over the
Internet. Their data consists of prices and quantities from a single vendor that lists
its price on Pricewatch.com. They ﬁnd that consumer’s are very price sensitive with
an estimated elasticity of demand for the ﬁrm’s product of −51.8. This is consistent
with what one would expect based on clearinghouse models.
IV Results
Figure 2 presents a time series graph of the average percentage gap for the period
surveyed.21 As this ﬁgure reveals, there is no discernible trend in price dispersion
over the survey period. Similar analyses for the other measures of dispersion, such as
the coeﬃcient of variation and range, likewise show little in the way of a trend. The
average coeﬃcient of variation is about 10 percent in both August 2000 and March
2001. The average percentage range declines slightly over the period, from about 40%
in August 2000 to 37% by March 2001.
“Place Figure 2 approximately here.”
Figure 3 presents a time series of the fraction of products for which the percentage
g a pe x c e e d s0 ,1 ,5 ,a n d1 0p e r c e n t .A st h eﬁgure shows, price dispersion over this
period is indeed a pervasive and stable phenomenon. On virtually any date in our
sample, there is a strictly positive gap between the lowest two prices for over 90
percent of the 1000 products sampled. About half of all products have a gap of 1
percent or more, about 20 percent of the products have a gap of over 5 percent, and
about 10 percent of the products have gaps exceeding 10 percent. Thus, a considerable
number of products have economically signiﬁcant gaps between the two lowest prices,and the distribution of gaps has remained relatively unchanged during the survey
period.
“Place Figure 3 approximately here.”
In short, there is little evidence that price dispersion is a disequilibrium phenom-
enon that is being corrected over time. If price dispersion is an equilibrium phenom-
enon, then levels of dispersion should vary with market structure. Figure 4 plots the
average percentage gap across all product dates against the number of ﬁrms listing
prices for that product. Notice that the average percentage gap declines sharply as
the number of ﬁrms listing prices increases. For products where only two ﬁrms list a
price, the percentage gap averages about 22 percent. As the number of ﬁrms listing
prices increases, the percentage gap falls dramatically. It is around 4 percent for
products where ten ﬁrms list prices. When ﬁfteen or more prices are listed, the gap
is less than 3 percent.22
“Place Figure 4 approximately here.”
Figure 4 suggests that price dispersion might vary systematically in the small and
in the large. However, this graph fails to account for systematic variation in the
number of ﬁr m so v e rt i m ea sw e l la sa c r o s sp r o d u c tr a n k s .I np a r t i c u l a r ,a sw es a wi n
Table I, the percentage gap is smaller for more popular products, but more popular
products tend to have more ﬁrms listing prices. To further confound these eﬀects,
over the survey period, there was a substantial decline in the number of merchants
listing prices on Shopper.com (and by E-retailers generally). The average number of
ﬁrms listing prices declined about 25 percent, from 20 to 16 ﬁrms.
To help disentangle these eﬀects, we use a simple econometric model to examine
the relationship between price dispersion and market structure. We report resultsbased on the gap measure (which, as noted above, provides a more accurate measure
of price dispersion in some environments).23 We regress price dispersion for a par-
ticular product date against a number of dummy variables that capture the eﬀects
of diﬀerences in market structure across products and across time. These controls
are potentially important, since the level of price dispersion in the general clearing-
house model depends on the relative size of the market. We use dummy variables for
product rank to proxy for these cross-sectional eﬀects (since product rank is a rough
measure of the popularity of a product) and 229 time dummies (one for each date)
to account for potential dynamic eﬀects.
“Place Table III approximately here.”
These results are summarized in Table III, and include a variety of speciﬁcations
that demonstrate a robust relationship between numbers of ﬁrms listing prices for a
given product and price dispersion.24 Model 1 presents a very simple speciﬁcation
of the relationship between price dispersion and numbers of price listings with no
controls and where numbers of ﬁrms listing prices are pooled into three bins. Model
2 uses this same speciﬁcation but adds product rank dummies. Model 3 uses in-
dividual dummies for numbers of ﬁrms listing prices, while Model 4 uses this same
speciﬁcation and adds controls for product rank. Finally, Model 5 is the most gen-
eral speciﬁcation, since it controls for both product rank and time ﬁxed eﬀects. In all
cases, reported t-statistics are based on robust standard errors to control for potential
heteroskedasticity.25
T h er e s u l t si nT a b l eI I Ia r es u p p o r t i v eo ft h ev i e wp o r t r a y e di nF i g u r e4t h a tt h e
percentage gap is lower when a large number of ﬁrms list prices than when a small
number of ﬁrms do. Models 1 and 2 indicate that, compared to the case where morethan 20 ﬁrms list prices, the gap is about 13.5 percent higher when fewer than ﬁve
ﬁrms list prices, and about 3.2 percent higher when 5 to 10 ﬁrms list prices. Beyond
10 ﬁr m s ,t h e r ei sl i t t l ed i ﬀerence in the percentage gaps. Models 3 through 5 show
that the results are robust to the bins used to categorize numbers of ﬁrms, controls
for product rank eﬀects (in Model 4), and potential date eﬀects (in Model 5).
Model 5 of Table III permits us to test the hypothesis that price dispersion is
diminishing over time against the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients on the date
ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly zero (as would be the case if price dispersion is stable over
time). As Table III shows, the p-value for this test is 0.23. Thus, based on the
gap measure of price dispersion, we ﬁnd no evidence for diminishing price dispersion,
which suggests that price dispersion may be an equilibrium phenomenon. Note that,
while the results indicate that price dispersion is lower for the most popular products
(those ranked in the top 100), the economic magnitude of these eﬀects are very small
compared to the impact on price dispersion of the number of ﬁrms listing prices.
One might speculate that the stable price dispersion documented above stems from
the fact that new products are entering the sample. In other words, price dispersion
for existing products might be falling over time, but convergence is masked by new
products entering the dataset with highly dispersed prices. While data limitations
prevent us from controlling for such eﬀects with the entire dataset, we collected
additional information on the top 100 products that permits us to show that the
qualitative results contained in Table III continue to hold with a ﬁxed set of products.
In particular, we collected product information for the top 100 products for which
price quotes existed on the ﬁrst date in our sample, and followed this ﬁxed set of
products over the eight month period. This permits us to not only examine whether
our ﬁnding that the gap is greater in the small than in the large is robust to controlsfor product-speciﬁce ﬀects, but also to examine whether there is any evidence for
convergence based on a ﬁxed set of products. These results are summarized in Table
IV.
“Place Table IV approximately here.”
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that including product-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects dramat-
ically increases the R2 from less than 10 percent to about 50 percent in all of the
speciﬁcations in Table IV. Furthermore, even with controls for product-speciﬁce ﬀects
and data containing a ﬁxed set of products, the gap remains greater in the small than
in the large. Looking at Model 1, the gap is 12.97 percent when four or fewer ﬁrms
list prices, and falls to essentially zero when ﬁve or more ﬁrms list prices. Models 2,
3, and 4 show that these ﬁndings are robust to controls for product rank eﬀects, the
bins used to count the number of ﬁrms, and date ﬁxed eﬀects.
“Place Table V approximately here.”
We can also use this subset of the data to re-examine whether dispersion is de-
creasing over time. The test of this hypothesis against the null hypothesis that the
date ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly zero in Table V fails to replicate the corresponding test in
Table III. Speciﬁcally, holding ﬁxed the set of products, we reject the null hypothesis
that all the date ﬁxed eﬀects are jointly zero at the 1% level. To examine whether this
stems from a downward trend in dispersion, Model 5 includes a linear trend variable,
Date Trend. The results here show that, contrary to the notion that price dispersion
is decreasing over the lifespans of a ﬁxed set of products, the coeﬃcient on Date
Trend is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding, that price dispersion is
increasing over time, is inconsistent with the view that dispersion is a disequilibrium
phenomenon that is being corrected over time.V Discriminating Among Clearinghouse Models
The ﬁndings reported above — that price dispersion depends on market structure and
is not diminishing over time — is broadly consistent with the notion that dispersion
is an equilibrium phenomenon. We conclude by taking a closer look at special cases
of the general clearinghouse model in an attempt to discriminate among them.
Before doing so, we note that the broad ﬁndings reported above are also consistent
with “naïve” pricing by ﬁrms, whereby “zero-intelligence” sellers simply post prices
at random that range from marginal cost to the monopoly price. In this case, the
distribution of prices is independent of n, but nonetheless the expected gap declines as
the number of sellers increases due purely to order-statistic eﬀects. This is in contrast
to clearinghouse models, where order-statistic eﬀects are confounded by strategic
responses by ﬁrms that lead to changes in the equilibrium distribution of prices as
the number of ﬁrms changes.
To compare these models, we performed the following calibration. We set con-
sumers’ maximal willingnesses to pay, r, equal to the average maximum price observed
in the data, which is $563. We normalize the number of consumers to be unity and set
S =0 .13, which is based on estimates by Brynjolfsson, Montgomery, and Smith [2003]
for the percentage of Internet users using price comparison sites over the 2000-2002
period. The number of loyal customers per ﬁrm is simply 1−S divided by the average
number of ﬁrms in our sample. In the case of the Varian and Baye-Morgan models,
the total number of loyals, M,i ss i m p l y1 − S. Marginal cost is calibrated based on
the US Census Bureau’s estimate of the average margin for Electronic Shopping and
Mail Order Retailers (NAICS 4541), which is 38.5%.26 Since clearinghouse models
predict that the average transactions price is a weighted-average of the average min-i m u mp r i c ea n dt h ea v e r a g el i s tp r i c e ,o n ec a nu s et h e s ed a t at oe s t i m a t em a r g i n a l
cost by m =$ 3 7 1 .27 This completely calibrates all of the models but Baye-Morgan,
which also requires a calibrated value for φ. We set φ =$ 3 .33,w h i c hi st h ea v e r a g e
cost per day of listing a price at Shopper.com during the period of our study.
Based on this somewhat crude calibration, Figure 6 displays the theoretical re-
lationship between the gap and the number of ﬁrms listing prices, which are the
theoretical analogues of Figure 4. While Proposition 2 showed that all of the models
predict price dispersion which is greater in the small than in the large, Figure 6 il-
lustrates that their predictions are dramatically diﬀerent when the number of listing
ﬁrms is in the range occurring in the data. In particular, notice that the Varian
model initially predicts an increasing relationship between the percentage gap and
the number of ﬁrms listing prices. This stems from the fact that the strategic eﬀect
of an increase in the number of ﬁrms on the equilibrium price distribution initially
overwhelms the order-statistic eﬀect, thereby leading to a predicted gap (for n<40)
that is opposite of the pattern observed in the data. The Rosenthal/Shilony models
more closely match the data, but the strategic eﬀect again pushes the distribution
of prices in a direction opposite to the order statistic eﬀe c t ,t h u sl e a d i n gt oo n l ya
modest decline in price dispersion. The Baye-Morgan model and the Naïve model
both predict a pattern similar to that observed in Figure 4.
While Figure 6 reveals sharp diﬀerences in the predictions of special cases of the
general clearinghouse model, it does not permit one to distinguish between equilib-
rium behavior (where changes in n have strategic eﬀects on price distributions) and
Naïve behavior (where they do not). A simple way of testing whether strategic eﬀects
are present is to examine whether the ﬁrst moment of the empirical distribution of
prices varies with n.28 Accordingly, we regress average prices on numbers of ﬁrmsalong with controls for product and date ﬁxed eﬀects. These results are presented in
Table V, and are based on the same ﬁxed set of products used in the analysis con-
tained in Table IV in order to permit controls for product-speciﬁce ﬀects. Speciﬁcally,
Table V reports results of both linear and a log-linear speciﬁcations of the dependent
variable and uses both OLS and 2SLS (where we instrument for the number of ﬁrms
using product rank). In all cases, the results indicate a negative relationship between
average price and the number of competing ﬁrms. We can reject at conventional
signiﬁcance levels the null hypothesis (implied by the Naïve model) that there is no
relationship between average prices and numbers of ﬁrms listing prices in favor of the
one-sided alternative that average prices decline with the number of competing ﬁrms.
In short, we ﬁnd evidence of strategic eﬀects in the data.
Are the observed strategic eﬀects consistent with the predictions of the general
clearinghouse model? To examine this question, we again use the calibrated models
to examine the theoretical relationship between average price and the number of
competing ﬁrms. As Figure 7 reveals, the Varian and Rosenthal/Shilony models
predict that greater competition leads to higher average prices. This is not only
counter-intuitive, but also contrary to the empirical ﬁndings reported in Table V. In
contrast, the Baye-Morgan model predicts that greater competition leads to lower
average prices, which is consistent with the data.
VI Conclusion
Our analysis indicates that the levels of price dispersion observed at Shopper.com were
stable over a period in which consumer usage of price comparison sites increased by
about 13 percent. Our empirical ﬁnding that both the level of dispersion and averageprices are greater in the small than in the large can be rationalized by a clearinghouse
framework, although some special cases of the general model more closely match the
observed data than others. Unfortunately, our dataset is not detailed enough to
permit the structural estimation required to further discriminate among competing
clearinghouse models. The ﬁndings reported here suggest that future research along
these lines might prove useful.
At a more general level, our results suggest that it is useful to control for market
structure in online markets when comparing levels of dispersion across products or
over time. Such controls permit one to disentangle dynamic eﬀects (such as learning
on the part of ﬁrms or the increased usage of price comparison sites by consumers)
from market structure eﬀects. Viewed in this context, our results compliment recent
work by Brown and Goolsbee [2002], who provide convincing evidence that the emer-
gence of the Internet led to sharp declines in insurance premiums during the 1990s.
Our results suggest that part of this decline might have stemmed from increases in
the number of insurance companies choosing to list their rates at price comparison
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The proof of part 2 of Proposition 1 relies on the following theorem, which estab-
lishes the existence of equilibrium in the general clearinghouse model.
Theorem 1 Let 0 ≤ φ<n−1
n (r − m)S. Then, a symmetric equilibrium of the
general clearinghouse model:

























n−1φ + Lr + Sm
L + S
.
3. When a ﬁrm does not list its price, it charges a price equal to r.
Proof.
First, observe that if a ﬁrm does not list its price at the clearinghouse, it is a
dominant strategy to charge a price of r.
Next, notice that α ∈ (0,1] whenever
nφ
(n − 1)(r − m)S
< 1.This condition holds, since φ<n−1
n (r − m)S.
We next show that F is a well-deﬁned cdf with m<p 0 <r .First,
p0 =
n
n−1φ +( Lr + Sm)
(L + S)
<
(r − m)S +( Lr + Sm)
(L + S)
= r,
where the inequality follows from the fact that φ< n
n−1 (r − m)S. Furthermore,
p0 =
n









where the weak inequality follows from the fact that φ ≥ 0 and the strict inequality
follows since r>m .




































n−1φ +( r − p)L
(p − m)S
> 0.
Next, we show that, conditional on listing a price, a ﬁr mc a nd on ob e t t e rt h a n
pricing according to F. I ti so b v i o u st h a tc h o o s i n gap r i c ea b o v eo rb e l o wt h es u p p o r t
of F is dominated by choosing a price in the support of F. A ﬁr mc h o o s i n gap r i c ep
in the support of F earns expected proﬁts of
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Using the binomial theorem, we can rewrite this as:























Since this is independent of p, it follows that F is a best response to the other n − 1
ﬁrms pricing based on F.
When φ =0 , it is a weakly dominant strategy to list. It remains to show that
when φ>0 and α ∈ (0,1),aﬁrm earns the same expected proﬁts regardless ofwhether it lists its price. But a ﬁrm that does not list earns expected proﬁts of












which equals the expected proﬁts earned by listing any price p ∈ [p0,r]. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
1. Baye-Morgan Model
Note that in the Baye-Morgan model, there is a distinction between the number
of competing ﬁrms (n) and the number of ﬁrms listing prices at the clearinghouse,
which we denote as k. To evaluate the case where the number of listings becomes
arbitrarily large requires one to ﬁr s tl e tt h en u m b e ro fc o m p e t i n gﬁrms go to inﬁnity
and then evaluate the order statistics of the limit distribution as k →∞to obtain
the expected gap as the number of listings on the clearinghouse grows large.
First, notice that as n →∞ , the limit distribution of listed prices is
lim

































Since F∗ (p) is atomless with positive support, it is clear that E (G) > 0 for ﬁnite






, converges to the lower












To establish this result, denote the cumulative distribution of the 2nd lowest of k
draws by H (t). It is well-known that for any cdf F,
H (p)=
¡
1 − (1 − F (p))
n − nF (p)(1− F (p))
n−1¢
,













where h(·) is evaluated using F (·)=F∗ (·) and with the corresponding density f∗ (·).



















0 + ε)H (p
∗
0 + ε)+r(1 − H (p
∗
0 + ε)).
Thus, to prove the result requires only that we show that limk→∞ H (p∗
0 + ε)=1 . To
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follows from the fact that p∗













0 +ε for small
ε>0. Q.E.D.
2. Varian Model
In the Varian model, F (p) is atomless with positive support, so it is clear that





























n→∞((p0 + ε)H (p0 + ε)+r(1 − H (p0 + ε))).
































= m + ε.
Finally,
lim




























= m+ε for small
ε>0. Q.E.D.
3. Rosenthal/Shilony Model
Since each ﬁrm in the Rosenthal/Shilony model earns expected proﬁts of Eπi =
(r − m)L, the assumption that L is a positive constant implies that expected industry
proﬁt,
Pn
i=1 Eπi = n(r − m)L, tends to inﬁnity as the number of ﬁrms increases
without bound. To mitigate this shortcoming while allowing initial entrants to bring
additional loyal consumers, it is necessary to slightly modify the model by assuming








where Π < ∞ and L∗ < ∞ are positive constants. In this case, it is easy to show
that industry proﬁts are bounded from above by Π.I nf a c t ,f o ra n yﬁnite n, expectedindustry proﬁts are
n X
i=1







Eπi = Π < ∞.
There exists a ﬁxed Π < ∞ such that the modiﬁed model is identical to the
original models for small and intermediate values of n (say, n ≤ 65). Since all of the
empirical results discussed in the text are based on markets where n ≤ 65,n o n eo f
the quantitative results discussed in the text depend on this modiﬁcation.
Since F (p) is atomless with positive support, it is clear that E [G] > 0 for ﬁnite n.
To show that limn→∞ E [G]=0 , notice that the limit version of the model is identical




1 See Bakos [2000] and Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson [2000] for excellent surveys of this work.
2 This ﬁgure is based on comparing price comparison site usage in the period 2000-2001 to the
period 2001-2002 using ﬁgures provided in Brynjolfsson, Montgomery, and Smith [2003].
3 See, for instance, Pratt, et al. [1979], Carlson and Pescatrice [1980], and Sorensen [2000].
4 See, for instance, Smith, Bailey, and Brynjolfsson [2000] as well as Bakos [2000].
5 Products with identical manufacturer part numbers.
6 See also Salop and Stiglitz [1977], Spulber [1995], Stahl [1989], Stahl [2000], and Janssen and
Moraga [2000]. These models also share the property that some fraction of consumers observe the
complete list of prices oﬀered by ﬁrms.
7 The predictions of models diﬀer in other dimensions, however, and we will explore some of
these in Section V.
8 It is straightforward to modify the model to allow for downward sloping demand.
9 An alternative interpretation of “loyal” consumers is as follows: “Loyal” consumers are fully
price sensitive, but do not access the clearinghouse site. Their search technology is such that the
optimal strategy is to choose a single ﬁrm at random and buy from it if its price is at or below r.
This interpretation is the one oﬀered in Varian and Baye-Morgan.
10 With 4 million observations, one might expect ﬁrms to occasionally make errors in posting
their prices. We sometimes observed prices that appeared to reﬂect a misplaced decimal, such as
a merchant quoting a price of $1000 or $1 instead of $100. While the results presented below are
based on the cleaned dataset with outliers omitted, the qualitative results presented below are not
aﬀected by the inclusion or exclusion of outliers.
11 Aq u a l i ﬁed lead occurs when a consumer “clicks-through” from the Shopper.com site to a
merchant’s site.
12 According to a June 2000 study by Media Metrix.
13 Based on 100hot.com rankings as of January 18, 2001.14 Merchants have the opportunity to update price quotes twice daily — once at 1:00am and again
at 2:00pm (Paciﬁc time). Thus, between each price observation that we collect, each ﬁrm had at
least one opportunity to change its price in response to rivals’ behavior. An audit of prices on April
27, 2001 revealed that over three-fourths of ﬁrms update their listing information at least once every
twenty-four hours.
15 More formally, the averages referred to in the table are constructed as follows. Let Jit denote
the set of ﬁrms listing a price for product rank i at time t. Let It denote the set of product ranks
for which 1 or more prices are listed in period t. Let T be the set of time periods. Finally, let pjit














Similar methodology was used to construct the other averages.
16 A shopbot is an automated search engine that visits multiple E-retailers’ sites to collect infor-
mation about prices and other attributes of consumer goods and services.
Early shopbots suﬀered from the defect that information listed there was at times irrelevant
and inaccurate. When we began our study, we considered using the price listing site mySimon.com,
which is based on shopbot technology. We rejected this approach because search results tended
to include a great deal of “noise.” For example, a product search using the search term “Palm V”
returned a list of products including not only our target item, but also a Deluxe Leather Carrying
Case, a Palm V HotSync Cradle, a Palm V Travel Charger, and a Palm V modem. For this reason,
we began collecting data from the Shopper.com site rather than from shopbots. We note that
the technology used by shopbots has dramatically improved in recent months, and it now appears
possible to collect accurate price information through mySimon.com and many other shopbots.
17 The clearinghouse models discussed in Section 2 operate under the assumption that ﬁrms cannot
or do not price discriminate. To examine whether this is the case at Shopper.com, we also conductedan audit of ten randomly selected products and compared the price listed on Shopper.com with that
obtained by eschewing Shopper.com and going directly to each merchant’s site. For the 132 price
listings sampled, there were only three cases where prices at the merchant’s site were higher than
those listed at Shopper.com. In these cases, prices at the three merchants’ sites were higher by only
$1.17, $1.83, and $0.11. The lowest prices for these items were, respectively, $214.99, $185, and $40.
18 Our personal experience, as well as over two years of data on the top 37 products, suggests
that shipping costs are fairly constant across ﬁrms; see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (forthcoming).
19 Other limitations of our data stem from tradeoﬀs made due to the sheer volume of data being
collected. We initially downloaded all of the information listed at the Shopper.com site for a subset of
the products, and results were robust to incorporating shipping costs, inventory, reputational ratings,
and a variety of other variables. We thus opted to collect the most relevant information on a larger
number of products rather than more extensive information on a smaller number. This approach
substantially reduced ﬁle sizes (enabling us to more thoroughly analyze the data) and reduced the
Spider’s demand for bandwidth at Shopper.com’s site (reducing the probability of Cnet.com taking
action to block us from their site).
20 To see this, notice that by raising its price slightly above marginal cost, a ﬁrm in a clearinghouse
model does not lose demand from uninformed or brand-loyal customers. Furthermore, it only loses
informed or price-conscious customers if the price increase results in another ﬁrm charging the lowest
price.
21 In examining price dispersion at Shopper.com, we restrict attention to product-dates where
two or more ﬁrms list prices since dispersion is trivially zero when only a single ﬁrm lists a price.
22 The average range also depends on market structure. Speciﬁcally, the range is signiﬁcantly
higher when many ﬁrms list prices than when few ﬁrms list prices. For products where only two
ﬁrms list a price, the range averages about 23 percent. When ﬁve or more ﬁrms list prices, the range
increases to a neighborhood of 40 percent.
23 We also ran regressions using the coeﬃcient of variation and range measures of price dispersion.These regressions also reject the hypothesis that price dispersion is invariant to the number of ﬁrms
at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
24 The results reported here treat the number of ﬁrms as exogenous. To control for potential
endogeneity, we also ran a variety of 2SLS regressions which instrumented for numbers of ﬁrms
using product ranks and obtained qualitatively similar results. Further, based on a Hausman test,
we failed to reject the hypothesis that the OLS and 2SLS estimates are identical.
25 The ﬁndings reported here are also robust to the use of cluster analysis to control for a potential
lack of independence across time.
26 Table 6: Estimated Gross Margin as Percent of Sales by Kind of Business, US Census Bureau,
Revised June 1, 2001.
27 The average transaction price is T = SE[p1]+(1− S)E [p]. Based on a gross margin of 38.5%,
marginal cost is m = .615T. The average minimum price and the average listed price in our data,
coupled with the estimate of S discussed above, yields our estimate of m.
28 We are grateful to Ken Hendricks for suggesting this test. 
 















































0 1 02 03 04 05 06 0















Varian Rosenthal/Shilony Naïve Baye-Morgan  














0 1 02 03 04 05 06 0











Varian Rosenthal/Shilony Naïve Baye-Morgan  









1 - 250 251 - 500 501 - 750 751 - 1000
Total Number of Prices
     Multi-Price Listings 3,925,947 1,202,912 960,709 904,256 858,070
     Single-Price Listings 13,743 2,846 3,416 3,785 3,696
Average Price in
$513.23 $472.73 $494.91 $529.60 $555.64
(882.8) (665.2)             (838.3)             (1,039.6)          (941.7)            
$491.64 $461.07 $476.41 $486.56 $543.08
(760.8)                (590.7)             (706.1)             (820.0)             (892.0)            
Average Minimum Price in
$457.62 $417.94 $442.78 $475.77 $493.93
(818.7)                (611.9)             (781.3)             (980.0)             (855.4)            
$432.47 $403.40 $420.97 $428.91 $477.09
(678.2)                (525.1)             (630.9)             (733.7)             (792.4)            
Average Number of Firms in
17.27 21.17 16.90 15.91 15.12
(11.7)                  (14.1)               (10.8)               (10.4)               (10.0)              
18.32 22.23 17.91 16.97 16.10
(11.3)                  (13.7)               (10.3)               (9.9)                 (9.6)                
Price Dispersion Measures
Total Observations in
     Multi-Price Listings 214,337 54,108 53,633 53,299 53,297
     Single-Price Listings 13,743 2,846 3,416 3,785 3,696
Average Range of Prices in
$123.43 $123.88 $117.21 $118.78 $133.87
(239.5)                (202.5)             (220.5)             (249.3)             (278.3)            
$131.35 $130.40 $124.67 $127.22 $143.15
(244.9)                (205.7)             (225.3)             (256.0)             (285.5)            
Average Coefficient of Variation in
9.10% 9.06% 9.15% 9.10% 9.10%
(8.0) (7.2) (7.9) (8.4) (8.6)
9.69% 9.54% 9.73% 9.75% 9.74%
(7.9)                    (7.1)                 (7.8)                 (8.3)                 (8.5)                
Average Gap in Low Prices 
4.39% 3.79% 4.03% 4.71% 5.03%
(16.2) (20.4) (9.9) (15.4) (17.3)
4.67% 3.99% 4.29% 5.04% 5.38%
(16.7)                  (20.9)               (10.2)               (15.9)               (17.8)              
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
     Multi-Price Listings
     Multi-Price Listings
     All Listings
     Multi-Price Listings
     All Listings
     Multi-Price Listings
     All Listings
     Multi-Price Listings
     All Listings
All Product 
Ranks
     All Listings
     Multi-Price Listings





1 13743 6.03 41 687 0.30
2 8791 3.85 42 548 0.24
3 8615 3.78 43 375 0.16
4 7363 3.23 44 294 0.13
5 7325 3.21 45 263 0.12
6 6972 3.06 46 224 0.10
7 6649 2.92 47 268 0.12
8 6708 2.94 48 296 0.13
9 5723 2.51 49 298 0.13
10 5924 2.60 50 309 0.14
11 5949 2.61 51 332 0.15
12 5967 2.62 52 334 0.15
13 6085 2.67 53 328 0.14
14 5814 2.55 54 309 0.14
15 5898 2.59 55 296 0.13
16 5751 2.52 56 237 0.10
17 6185 2.71 57 236 0.10
18 6044 2.65 58 189 0.08
19 6154 2.70 59 141 0.06
20 6441 2.82 60 132 0.06
21 6408 2.81 61 72 0.03
22 6426 2.82 62 67 0.03
23 6834 3.00 63 31 0.01
24 6877 3.02 64 39 0.02
25 6265 2.75 65 26 0.01
26 6404 2.81 66 8 0.00
27 6231 2.73 67 2 0.00
28 5853 2.57 68 3 0.00
29 5292 2.32 69 0 0.00
30 4655 2.04 70 0 0.00
31 4132 1.81 71 0 0.00
32 3379 1.48 72 0 0.00
33 3046 1.34 73 0 0.00
34 2721 1.19 74 0 0.00
35 2341 1.03 75 0 0.00
36 1879 0.82 76 1 0.00
37 1592 0.70 77 0 0.00
38 1391 0.61 78 1 0.00
39 1074 0.47 79 0 0.00
40 831 0.36 80 or more 2 0.00
 Table III: Impact of the Number of Firms Listing Prices on the Percentage Gap
Dummy Variable for: Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Number of Firms Listing Prices
Between 2 and 4 Firms 0.1362 (49.9) 0.1352 (48.8)
Between 5 and 10 Firms 0.0316 (45.8) 0.0308 (44.8)
Between 11 and 20 Firms 0.0058 (22.5) 0.0051 (18.8)
2 Firms 0.2074 (33.2) 0.2052 (32.6) 0.2063 (104.2)
3 Firms 0.1151 (34.5) 0.1126 (33.5) 0.1142 (57.1)
4 Firms 0.0892 (25.4) 0.0871 (25.0) 0.0887 (41.8)
5 Firms 0.0760 (25.1) 0.0736 (24.5) 0.0752 (35.3)
6 Firms 0.0389 (27.6) 0.0366 (25.8) 0.0381 (17.6)
7 Firms 0.0268 (29.4) 0.0249 (26.8) 0.0264 (12.0)
8 Firms 0.0223 (27.3) 0.0204 (24.6) 0.0220 (10.0)
9 Firms 0.0203 (24.2) 0.0183 (21.5) 0.0200 (8.6)
10 Firms 0.0212 (24.8) 0.0190 (22.0) 0.0206 (8.9)
11 Firms 0.0187 (22.8) 0.0166 (20.1) 0.0182 (7.9)
12 Firms 0.0131 (18.4) 0.0114 (15.6) 0.0131 (5.7)
13 Firms 0.0145 (16.0) 0.0128 (13.8) 0.0145 (6.3)
14 Firms 0.0080 (12.7) 0.0064 (9.5) 0.0077 (3.3)
15 Firms 0.0122 (11.5) 0.0103 (9.6) 0.0115 (5.0)
16 Firms 0.0048 (7.9) 0.0031 (4.8) 0.0044 (1.9)
17 Firms 0.0065 (11.0) 0.0045 (7.1) 0.0060 (2.6)
18 Firms 0.0058 (10.1) 0.0040 (6.4) 0.0057 (2.5)
19 Firms 0.0058 (10.6) 0.0036 (6.2) 0.0054 (2.4)
20 Firms 0.0079 (13.2) 0.0056 (8.9) 0.0074 (3.3)
21 Firms 0.0046 (9.5) 0.0025 (4.7) 0.0040 (1.8)
22 Firms 0.0066 (11.1) 0.0042 (6.7) 0.0057 (2.5)
23 Firms 0.0055 (10.0) 0.0032 (5.6) 0.0046 (2.1)
24 Firms 0.0064 (10.7) 0.0042 (6.8) 0.0056 (2.6)
25 Firms 0.0063 (10.3) 0.0042 (6.8) 0.0051 (2.3)
26 Firms 0.0066 (11.5) 0.0046 (7.8) 0.0059 (2.6)
27 Firms 0.0073 (12.7) 0.0056 (9.4) 0.0063 (2.8)
28 Firms 0.0045 (8.8) 0.0029 (5.5) 0.0036 (1.5)
29 Firms 0.0046 (8.8) 0.0030 (5.5) 0.0038 (1.6)
30 Firms 0.0052 (9.3) 0.0032 (5.5) 0.0037 (1.4)
Product Rank Categories
Product Ranks 101 - 200 0.0235 (11.0) 0.0231 (10.8) 0.0228 (14.7)
Product Ranks 201 - 300 0.0084 (12.5) 0.0083 (12.2) 0.0079 (5.1)
Product Ranks 301 - 400 0.0081 (11.7) 0.0080 (11.2) 0.0076 (4.9)
Product Ranks 401 - 500 0.0096 (11.7) 0.0089 (10.8) 0.0086 (5.5)
Product Ranks 501 - 600 0.0114 (11.8) 0.0108 (11.2) 0.0104 (6.7)
Product Ranks 601 - 700 0.0129 (11.5) 0.0121 (10.8) 0.0117 (7.5)
Product Ranks 701 - 800 0.0189 (13.1) 0.0175 (12.1) 0.0171 (10.9)
Product Ranks 801 - 900 0.0144 (12.5) 0.0135 (11.6) 0.0130 (8.3)
Product Ranks 901 - 1000 0.0121 (11.9) 0.0110 (10.7) 0.0106 (6.7)
Other Controls






All Date Fixed Effects are Zero
     p-value
All Number of Firm Effects are Zero
    p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.24
214,337
0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
214,337 214,337 214,337 214,337
Yes No No No No
Dependent variable: Percentage Gap. The sample is drawn from Shopper.com for the period 2 August, 2000 to March 31, 2001. Each model estimates an OLS 
regression of the dependent variable on market and product variables obtained from Shopper.com. Coefficients on the date fixed effects are suppressed. Robust t-
statistics are reported in parentheses to the right. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
 Table IV: Impact of the Number of Firms Listing Prices on the Percentage Gap (Fixed Sample)
Dummy Variable for: Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient  t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Number of Firms Listing Prices
Between 2 and 4 Firms 0.1297 (12.2) 0.1268 (12.0)
Between 5 and 10 Firms -0.0006 (0.2) 0.0019 (0.5)
Between 11 and 20 Firms 0.0041 (1.8) 0.0074 (3.2)
2 Firms 0.1632 (11.9) 0.1462 (10.7) 0.1459 (10.7)
3 Firms 0.0992 (8.7) 0.0836 (7.4) 0.0836 (7.4)
4 Firms 0.1511 (9.9) 0.1357 (9.4) 0.1318 (9.0)
5 Firms 0.0263 (3.5) 0.0170 (2.2) 0.0175 (2.2)
6 Firms 0.0140 (2.1) 0.0034 (0.5) 0.0063 (0.9)
7 Firms -0.0092 (1.5) -0.0206 (3.8) -0.0171 (3.1)
8 Firms -0.0002 (0.0) -0.0103 (1.9) -0.0082 (1.6)
9 Firms -0.0041 (0.8) -0.0112 (2.1) -0.0094 (1.8)
10 Firms 0.0176 (2.8) 0.0119 (1.8) 0.0132 (2.0)
11 Firms 0.0254 (5.6) 0.0185 (3.9) 0.0216 (4.7)
12 Firms 0.0221 (4.6) 0.0165 (3.5) 0.0210 (4.4)
13 Firms 0.0101 (2.5) 0.0066 (1.6) 0.0092 (2.2)
14 Firms 0.0058 (1.6) 0.0055 (1.5) 0.0068 (1.9)
15 Firms -0.0007 (0.2) -0.0001 (0.0) -0.0010 (0.2)
16 Firms -0.0025 (0.7) 0.0004 (0.1) -0.0001 (0.0)
17 Firms 0.0030 (0.8) 0.0056 (1.4) 0.0052 (1.3)
18 Firms 0.0004 (0.1) 0.0043 (1.2) 0.0035 (1.0)
19 Firms -0.0018 (0.6) 0.0010 (0.3) -0.0006 (0.2)
20 Firms 0.0061 (1.7) 0.0057 (1.5) 0.0048 (1.3)
21 Firms 0.0003 (0.1) 0.0002 (0.1) -0.0009 (0.2)
22 Firms 0.0010 (0.3) -0.0027 (0.8) -0.0034 (1.0)
23 Firms 0.0056 (1.7) 0.0062 (1.8) 0.0063 (1.9)
24 Firms 0.0036 (0.8) 0.0037 (0.8) 0.0024 (0.5)
25 Firms 0.0082 (2.1) 0.0068 (1.7) 0.0076 (1.9)
26 Firms 0.0098 (2.6) 0.0061 (1.6) 0.0077 (2.0)
27 Firms 0.0062 (2.4) 0.0043 (1.6) 0.0042 (1.6)
28 Firms 0.0039 (1.6) 0.0045 (1.8) 0.0022 (0.9)
29 Firms 0.0056 (2.5) 0.0056 (2.3) 0.0041 (1.8)
30 Firms -0.0033 (1.9) -0.0072 (3.4) -0.0058 (3.0)
Product Rank Categories
Product Ranks 11 - 20 -0.0001 (0.0) 0.0006 (0.3) 0.0007 (0.4)
Product Ranks 21 - 30 0.0079 (3.0) 0.0078 (3.1) 0.0073 (3.0)
Product Ranks 31 - 40 0.0133 (4.3) 0.0130 (4.5) 0.0132 (4.6)
Product Ranks 41 - 50 0.0151 (4.2) 0.0127 (3.7) 0.0113 (3.3)
Product Ranks 51 - 60 0.0157 (4.2) 0.0133 (3.8) 0.0130 (3.7)
Product Ranks 61 - 70 0.0135 (3.4) 0.0105 (2.7) 0.0101 (2.6)
Product Ranks 71 - 80 0.0011 (0.3) -0.0030 (0.8) -0.0035 (0.9)
Product Ranks 81 - 90 -0.0097 (2.3) -0.0163 (3.9) -0.0162 (3.9)
Product Ranks 91 - 100 0.0003 (0.1) -0.0073 (1.4)
Other Controls
Intercept 0.0186 (16.8) 0.0125 (5.4) 0.0161 (11.8) -0.0060 (1.1) -1.5894 (10.4)







All Date Fixed Effects are Zero
     p-value
All Number of Firm Effects are Zero
    p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent variable: Percentage Gap. The fixed sample of 88 products is drawn from Shopper.com for the period 2 August, 2000 to March 31, 2001. Each model estimates 
an OLS regression of the dependent variable on market and product variables obtained from Shopper.com. Coefficients on the product fixed effects and date fixed effects 
are suppressed. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
No No No No Yes
9,457
0.47 0.48 0.49 0.52 0.51
9,457 9,457 9,457 9,457Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Independent Variables
Number of Firms -0.3695 (2.7) -1.0026 (3.5)
ln(Number of Firms) -0.0137 (2.5) -0.0245 (1.9)












Average Price Dependent Variable
Dependent variables: Average Price and natural log of Average Price. The fixed sample of 88 products is drawn from Shopper.com for the period 2 
August, 2000 to March 31, 2001. Models 1 and 2 estimate OLS regressions of the Average Price and the natural log of Average Price, respectively, on 
market and product variables obtained from Shopper.com. Models 3 and 4 estimate two-stage least squares regressions of the dependent variables 
Average Price and the natural log of Average Price, respectively, on market and product variables obtained from Shopper.com. Coefficient estimates 
on the product fixed effects and date fixed effects are suppressed. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses to the right.
Model 2
ln(Average Price)
0.99
Yes
Yes
9741
0.98
Yes
Yes
9741
Yes
0.98
Average Price
Model 4
ln(Average Price)
9741
Model 3
 